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Accruals quality vis-à-vis disclosure quality:  
Substitutes or complements? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The impact of accruals quality and disclosure quality on stock returns is a topical issue in 
market-based accounting research. Most of the debate is centred on their incremental 
ability to predict future earnings. Recent studies suggest that higher information risk 
proxied by either lower accruals quality or lower disclosure quality results in higher stock 
returns. This paper examines the relationship between accruals quality and disclosure 
quality, and investigates whether they are complements or substitutes in explaining the 
time-series variation in portfolio returns. Applying portfolio groupings, we find a positive 
association between accruals quality and disclosure quality, suggesting that firms with 
higher disclosure quality engage less in earnings management and have higher accruals 
quality. Asset pricing tests show that an accruals quality factor and a disclosure quality 
factor explain the time-series variation in the excess returns of similar sets of portfolios. 
This suggests that they contain similar information and confirms the substitutive nature of 
accruals quality and disclosure quality factors.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A large body of theoretical research suggests that information risk is a non-
diversifiable risk factor (e.g., O’Hara, 2003; Easley and O’Hara, 2007). Among the 
suggested proxies for information risk are accruals quality and disclosure quality (see for 
example, Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper 2005; Hussainey and Mouselli, 2010).  
However, there is no consensus either on how to proxy this information risk or on the 
relationship between different measures. We address this concern by considering the link 
between two widely used measures of information risk: accruals quality and disclosure 
quality. Both have been defined variously in the extant literature but none of these 
definitions has achieved universal acceptance. In this study, accruals quality is defined as 
the extent to which accruals are well captured by fitted values obtained by regressing the 
change in non-cash working capital on changes in a firm’s economic conditions 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; Beneish, 1998). Another concept of accruals quality 
proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) refers to the degree to which accruals map into 
cash flows. With respect to disclosure quality, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) define the 
term as the accuracy of investors’ beliefs about share prices following the disclosure, 
while Hopkins (1996) views it as the degree to which investors can easily read and 
understand the information. Our definition of disclosure quality refers to the quantity of 
future-oriented earnings statements in the annual report narrative sections. 
Prior research indicates that accruals quality is associated with information 
asymmetry (Dye, 1985; Trueman and Titman, 1988; Richardson, 2000). Further, the level 
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of corporate disclosure is negatively associated with the level of information asymmetry 
between managers and outside investors (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Welker, 1995; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Drawing upon these two 
streams of literature, we examine the degree to which accruals quality is related to 
corporate disclosure and in particular, whether accruals quality and disclosure quality are 
complements or substitutes in explaining the time-series variation in portfolio returns.  
We use the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy for a firm’s accruals 
quality, a measure of earnings management that has been used extensively in prior 
studies. In essence, earnings management is the result of some degree of flexibility 
accorded by Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) as well as the discretion 
managers have in reporting their financial performance. Managers may use this discretion 
either to manage earnings opportunistically (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994) or to 
communicate private value-relevant information about future performance (Healy and 
Palepu, 1993). However, much of the prior literature finds that earnings management is 
carried out in order to either mislead financial statement users or to bias contractual 
outcomes that depend on accounting earnings (e.g. Burgstahler and Eames, 2003). This 
study focuses on accruals which represent the difference between a firm’s reported 
earnings and its cash flows. Large positive accruals indicate that earnings are much 
higher than the cash flows generated by the firm. This difference arises due to accounting 
conventions concerning when and how much revenues and expenditures are recognised. 
Prior empirical studies (e.g., Sloan, 1996; Hogue and Loughran, 2000; Richardson, Sloan 
Soliman and Tuna, 2005) find that the accruals component of earnings can be used to 
predict future stock returns, and  demonstrate that a trading strategy based on this 
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predictability results in significant abnormal returns. Our proxy for disclosure quality is 
based on the number of future-oriented statements in the narrative sections contained in 
the corporate annual report that contain earnings-related topics.  
Previous theoretical and empirical research provides mixed evidence on the 
relationship between accruals quality and disclosure quality. Grossman and Hart (1980), 
Milgrom (1981) and Verrecchia (1983 and 2001) argue that information asymmetry 
between firm managers and outside shareholders generates a demand for increased 
disclosure and provides an incentive for firms to disclose, because the value of 
incremental information is greater in this environment. Firms with poor accruals quality 
provide more comprehensive disclosure, because the extent of information asymmetry 
between the firm and investors is higher in such firms. On the contrary, Dye (1985), Jung 
and Kwon (1988) and Verrecchia (1990) develop theoretical models to show that, firms 
have incentives to disclose less information, as earnings quality decreases.
1
 Firms with 
poor earnings quality disclose less information, because investors treat the disclosure of 
such firms as less credible. A more recent study by Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008) 
also confirms the complementary association between earnings quality and voluntary 
disclosure, suggesting that firms with good earnings quality select higher levels of 
disclosure vis-à-vis firms with poor earnings quality. However, this link disappears when 
they control for earnings quality, implying that voluntary disclosure has little or no 
distinct pricing effect. 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘earnings quality’ in itself has no established definition and has been used with different 
interpretations. Some relate to the persistence and predictability of earnings, i.e., earnings that provides a 
good indication of future earnings (e.g. Penman, 2003, Dechow and Schrand, 2004). Others relate to the 
accurate representation of underlying economic transactions and events (e.g., Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and 
Lakonishok, 2006).  
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This paper examines the relationship between accruals quality and disclosure quality 
for UK non-financial firms that are listed on the stock market during the period July 1997 
to June 2004. We report empirical evidence for a positive association between accruals 
quality and disclosure quality, which suggests that firms with higher disclosure quality 
engage less in discretionary accruals. Moreover, asset pricing tests show that both an 
accruals quality factor (AQF) and a disclosure quality factor (DQF) explain the time-
series variation in excess returns for similar sets of portfolios. This suggests that the AQF 
and DQF contain similar information and is consistent with the notion that accruals 
quality and disclosure quality are close substitutes. 
Our contribution to market-based accounting research is two-fold. First, we extend 
the literature on corporate disclosure and accruals quality. Specifically, we examine the 
empirical relationship between disclosure quality, accruals quality and stock returns. 
Second, Fama and French (1993, 1996) demonstrate that risk factors constructed on the 
basis of book-to-market (HML) and market value (SMB) are incrementally important in 
explaining the time-series variation of US portfolio returns. We estimate accruals quality 
and disclosure quality factors and add them to the Fama-French three-factor model, in 
order to investigate their usefulness in explaining the component of the time-series 
variation of UK portfolio returns that is otherwise unexplained by the original Fama-
French factors. We examine whether accruals quality and disclosure quality, interpreted 
as risk factors, are complements or substitutes in explaining the time-series variation 
in portfolio stock returns. To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work that 
addresses this issue. 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous 
literature, and develops our research questions. Sections 3 and 4 describe the proxies used 
for disclosure quality and accruals quality. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 
presents and interprets the empirical results. Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2. Disclosure quality, accruals quality and stock returns 
 
This study builds on extant research concerning the link between corporate disclosure 
and accruals quality. With respect to corporate disclosure, the discretion exercised by 
managers in disclosing privately-held information has been examined both analytically 
and empirically in prior literature. Analytical models suggest that managers disclose 
private information because investors would interpret it as information censoring and 
discount the value of the firm accordingly. Corporate disclosure transforms private 
information into public information and reduces the information asymmetry between 
managers and outside shareholders (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 
1994). Furthermore, increased disclosure allows outsiders to be more confident that 
transactions occur at fair prices, leading to increased liquidity, reduced cost of capital and 
increased analyst following (Botosan, 1997; Sengupta 1998; Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia 2007). For example, Botosan 
(1997) documents that greater level of corporate disclosure is associated with a lower 
cost of equity capital. Similarly, Sengupta (1998) finds that high disclosure ratings are 
inversely associated with the cost of debt. Botosan and Plumlee (2002) document that the 
cost of equity capital decreases in the annual report disclosure level but increases in the 
level of disclosure in quarterly reports. Finally, many empirical papers report that 
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voluntary disclosure improves investors’ ability to anticipate future earnings changes (see 
for example, Schleicher and Walker, 1999; Lundholm and Myers, 2002; Gelb and 
Zarowin, 2002; Hussainey, Schleicher and Walker, 2003).  
Prior research also demonstrates a link between accruals quality and information 
asymmetry. Dye (1985) and Trueman and Titman (1988) develop analytical models 
suggesting that the existence of information asymmetry between managers and outside 
shareholders is a necessary condition for earnings management.
2
 In a similar vein, 
Richardson (2000) argues that management’s discretionary ability to manage earnings 
increases as the information asymmetry between management and shareholders increases. 
The degree of information asymmetry, measured by the bid-ask spread and the dispersion 
in analysts’ forecasts, is positively related to the propensity for earnings management. 
Theory provides conflicting conjectures on the relationship between disclosure 
quality and accruals quality. One body of literature (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Milgrom, 
1981; Verrecchia, 1983) suggests that managers disclose information because outside 
investors view non-disclosure of information as unfavourable and as a result, mark down 
the firm’s value. Information asymmetry between managers and outside shareholders 
creates a demand for disclosure and provides an incentive for firms to disclose, because 
the value of additional information is greater in this setting. Consequently, firms with 
poor financial reporting quality provide more comprehensive disclosure, because 
information asymmetry between the firm and investors is higher in such cases. If a 
measure of the firm’s accruals quality is used to proxy for information asymmetry, the 
                                                 
2
 Dye (1988) posits the existence of overlapping groups of buying and selling shareholders. Selling 
shareholders allow managers to adopt a certain earnings management strategy in order to impress buying 
shareholders. The manager has an information advantage over outside investors. Hence, information 
asymmetry is a necessary condition for earnings management in this setting. 
9 
 
implication is that the extent of a firm’s disclosure is inversely related to accruals quality. 
Based on the contrary view that accruals quality and disclosure quality are complements, 
another strand of literature suggests that managers have incentives to disclose more, as 
financial reporting quality increases (Verrecchia, 1990). Firms with poor accruals quality 
will provide less expansive disclosure, because investors tend to treat such disclosure as 
less credible. 
Drawing upon the conflicting theoretical evidence described above, it is not 
surprising that empirical research has also provided mixed results on the direction of the 
relationship between disclosure quality and accruals quality. In tests using management 
forecasts as a proxy for voluntary disclosure and earnings volatility as a proxy for 
information quality, Imhoff (1978), Cox (1985) and Waymire (1985) demonstrate that 
forecast frequency is inversely related to earnings volatility. Francis et al., (2008) report 
that firms with high earnings quality have more expansive voluntary disclosure than firms 
with poor earnings quality. On the contrary, Lang and Lundholm (1993) use the 
Association for Investment Management Research (AIMR) ratings as a proxy for 
voluntary disclosure, and the correlation between annual returns and annual earnings as a 
proxy for financial reporting quality. They report an inverse relationship between the 
level of disclosure and the quality of financial reporting. In particular, firms with low 
returns-earnings correlations have higher AIMR ratings. Similarly, Tasker (1998) reports 
an inverse relationship between the likelihood that a firm uses conference calls (proxy for 
DQ) and earnings informativeness. Nevertheless, Dargenidou, McLeay and Raonic 
(2011) show both disclosure and accruals jointly affect earnings expectations that are 
included in current stock returns. Athanasakou and Hussainey (2010) also suggest 
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that disclosure quality substitutes for poor innate earnings quality and complements high 
discretionary earnings quality. In an asset pricing model, recent empirical evidence shows 
that  an accrual quality (AQ) factor and  a disclosure quality (DQ) factor explain the time-
series variation in portfolio returns (e.g., Core, Guay and Verdi, 2008; Hussainey and 
Mouselli, 2010).  
Based on the above, this paper aims to answer the following two questions. First, 
what is the relationship between corporate disclosure and a firm’s accruals quality? 
Second, are disclosure quality and accruals quality substitutes or complementary in 
explaining the time-series variation in portfolio returns?  
 
3. Disclosure quality measure 
The measurement of the quality of corporate disclosure is extraordinarily difficult 
due to the lack of a clear definition of ‘quality’ (Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther, 2010). 
Therefore, we use a narrow definition for disclosure quality; the quantity of future-
oriented earnings statements in annual report narrative sections. This measure is chosen 
due to the fact that the inclusion of future-oriented information in the annual report 
narratives is highly recommended by the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB, 2006). 
In particular, the ASB has recommended the adoption of a revised OFR, which “… 
should have a forward-looking orientation identifying those trends and factors relevant to 
the members’ assessment of the current and future performance of the business and the 
progress towards the achievement of long-term business objectives” (ASB, 2006:9-10). 
Following the withdrawal of the legal requirement to publish an Operating and Financial 
Review (OFR), it has been reduced to a statement of best practice. Second, prior research 
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indicates that future-oriented earnings statements increase the stock market’s ability to 
forecast future earnings changes (Schleicher and Walker, 1999; Hussainey et al., 2003; 
Schleicher et al., 2007; Hussainey and Walker, 2009; Hussainey and Mouselli, 2010).  
      We follow Hussainey et al., (2003) and obtain disclosure scores for a large-scale 
sample of UK non-financial firms. Hussainey et al., (2003)’s study is considered as an 
early response to Core’s (2001) recommendation that improved disclosure measures 
should be developed, perhaps drawing on techniques borrowed from disciplines such as 
computer science, linguistics and artificial intelligence.
3
  Hussainey et al. (2003) use a 
text analysis software package to automate the generation of disclosure scores (i.e. the 
number of future-oriented earnings statements in the narrative sections of corporate 
annual reports) 
Following Hussainey et al., (2003), DQ scores are calculated for our sample firms in 
three stages. First, we search annual report narrative sections for the existing future-
oriented statements. We use the future-oriented keywords list suggested by Hussainey et 
al., (2003:277) for this purpose. This list contains thirty five keywords as well as future 
year numbers preceded by one of the following prepositions: ‘during’, ‘for’, ‘in’, ‘into’, 
‘of’, ‘through’ or ‘throughout. Panel A Table 1 shows our list of future-oriented 
keywords. Second, we search annual report narrative sections for earnings statements. 
We use the list of earnings keywords suggested by Hussainey et al., (2003: 280) for this 
purpose. This list represents earnings topics relevant to stock markets, and is based on 
exploring types of information in a sample of brokerage reports (see Hussainey et al, 
2003 for more details). This list includes twelve keywords as shown in Panel B Table 1. 
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Finally, we count the number of sentences that include at least one future-oriented 
keyword and at least one earnings indicator.  
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
4. Accruals quality measure 
 
A number of approaches have been used in the extant literature in estimating accruals 
quality (AQ). In this paper, we use absolute discretionary accruals as our proxy for AQ.
4
 
We estimate discretionary accruals using the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 
1995).  The advantages and disadvantages of this model are discussed by Guay, Kothari 
and Watts (1996), Young (1999), Thomas and Zhang (2000), Fields, Lys and Vincent 
(2001), Lo (2008), Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) and DeFond (2010). According to 
Botsari and Meeks (2008), while the modified-Jones model has drawbacks, no alternative 
approach offers a superior solution to the problem of estimating discretionary accruals; 
and according to Subramanyam (1996), discretionary accruals estimated using this model 
are priced by the market.   
In estimating the modified-Jones model, we employ a cross-sectional model in order 
to maximise the sample size and avoid the problem of survivorship bias that is inherent in 
the use of a firm-specific time-series approach (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; 
                                                 
4
 Another accruals quality measure widely used in the extant literature, introduced by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) and modified by McNichols (2002), is based on the standard deviation of the residuals calculated 
from a model of working capital accruals. Several studies use this measure as a proxy for accruals quality 
(Cohen, 2006; Francis et al., 2005). However, recent evidence suggests that the standard deviation of 
residual accruals is not a valid proxy of either accounting quality or overall earnings quality. For example, 
Hribar and Nichols (2007) find that firms with negative cash from operations also have larger residuals 
from models of working capital accruals. In view of this evidence, we elect to use discretionary accruals 
based on the modified-Jones model of Dechow et al., (1995). 
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Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2005). Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2000) report that the cross-
sectional model performs better than the time-series model in detecting earnings 
management, and Subramanyam (1994) demonstrates that the parameter estimates in the 
cross-sectional model are more accurate than their time-series counterparts, owing to the 
larger number of degrees of freedom.  Following extant studies, we focus on the 
discretionary component of total current accruals (TCA).
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The total current accrual is defined 
 
)()( STDebtCLCashCATCA                                                                (1) 
 
where: 
 
∆CA   =  change in current assets 
∆CL    =  change in current liabilities  
∆Cash   =  change in cash and cash equivalent 
∆STDebt   =  change in short-term debt 
 
To compute the discretionary accruals for a given firm-year observation, we first 
estimate the following equation using ordinary least squares (OLS) for all sample firms in 
each industry sector for which at least 10 observations were available in year t: 
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5
 Beneish (1998) argues that modelling total current accruals is appealing, because earnings management 
via the depreciation accrual is limited, as any change in the useful life or depreciation method has to be 
disclosed in the financial statements. Furthermore, it is difficult for managers to manage earnings through 
depreciation by timing capital expenditures. 
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where: ΔREVi,t is the change in firm i’s revenue in year t. Deflation of each variable by 
the lagged value of firm i’s total assets (TAi,t-1) corrects for heteroscedasticity in the 
disturbance term of the model specified in terms of variables that are not deflated, 
following prior work in this area. Using the industry- and year-specific estimates of 1 
and 2, we estimate for each sample firm the non-discretionary portion of its total current 
accruals as follows: 
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The non-discretionary accruals (NDAC), which represents the portion of total 
current accruals dictated by the firm’s sales growth, is viewed as independent of 
managerial discretion.  In (3), we subtract the change in accounts receivable (∆AR) from 
sales growth to allow for the possibility of credit sales manipulation by the firm, which 
might allow more generous credit terms to obtain sales prior to an earnings 
announcement (Dechow et al., 1995). We define absolute discretionary accruals (DAC) as 
the remaining portion of the total current accruals: 
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Accruals quality is proxied by absolute discretionary accruals (DAC). Ceteris 
paribus, the higher the numerical value of DAC, the lower is the accruals quality. 
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5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
    The sample period for the present study is July 1997 to June 2004. The source used for 
the annual report narrative sections (chairman’s statements and OFR), the Dialog 
database, was discontinued by Thomson Financial in mid-2004. The year 2002 is the last 
for which comprehensive annual reports coverage is available.
6
 The initial sample of 
accruals quality data, which covers all UK non-financial firms for which the accruals 
quality measure is available, comprises 7,989 firms. We match this data with 6,999 non-
financial firms with at least one annual report available from Dialog, and remove firms 
with missing accounting information. The final sample consists of 5,723 usable firm-year 
observations. We use the accruals quality and disclosure quality scores for 1996 to 
construct quintile portfolios of accruals quality and disclosure quality, respectively, from 
July 1997 to June 1998, through to July 2003 to June 2004. The empirical model involves 
a simple modification to the Fama and French (1993) model to accommodate possible 
accruals quality and disclosure quality factors. We estimate risk models for two sets of 
portfolios: 16 intersected size-BM portfolios and 20 industry portfolios, based on a time-
series of 84 monthly observations. 
 
Fama and French (1993) run time-series regressions of portfolio excess returns on three 
risk factors as follows: 
                                                 
6
 We acknowledge that the narrative sections of annual reports have become more standardised, and have 
expanded greatly since 2004. The non-availability of a database for annual report narratives in text format 
for a large sample of UK firms makes it difficult to extend our analysis beyond 2004. 
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ittiSMBtiHMLftMtiMiftit SMBHMLRRaRR   )(                                  (5) 
 
where: 
MtR  
is the return on the market portfolio. tt SMBHML ,  are the value factor and size factor 
for month t (explained below), respectively. 
Our sample for the construction of Fama-French factors (HML and SMB) uses 
monthly returns data for all UK listed firms, live and dead, over the period July 1997 to 
June 2004. To avoid survivorship bias, we include in our sample companies that have 
been delisted due to merger or failure. We exclude companies with more than one class 
of ordinary share, companies with negative book-to-market ratios, and companies 
belonging to the financial sector to be consistent with Dimson, Nagel and Quigley 
(2003). Annual accounting data is obtained from Datastream, and monthly returns data 
from the London Share Price Database (LSPD).  
     In the construction of the portfolios, when a component stock delists during a portfolio 
holding period, the proceeds from delisted stock are assumed to be distributed among 
other stocks in the portfolio in proportion to their weights.  We set the delisting returns to 
-100% when the LSPD death type is liquidation (7), quotation cancelled for reason 
unknown (14), receiver appointed/liquidation (16), in administration (20) or cancelled 
and assumed valueless (21). We use the value-weighted return on the Financial Times All 
Share index as a proxy for the return on the market portfolio.    
     We follow Dimson et al., (2003) in constructing the Fama-French factors. At the end 
of June for each year t, stocks are allocated to two groups, small (S) or big (B), on the 
basis of being above or below the 70
th
 percentile of the distribution of market value. 
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Stocks are also allocated, independently, to three book-to-market groups, low (L), 
medium (M) or high (H), according to the breakpoints of the bottom 40%, middle 20% 
and top 40% of the values of BM recorded at the end of year t-1. Six size-BM portfolios 
(SL, SM, SH, BL, BM, BH) are defined by the intersections of the two size and three BM 
groups. We calculate the value-weighted monthly returns for the six size-BM portfolios 
for the subsequent twelve months. 
SMB is defined as the monthly difference between the average of the returns on the 
three small size portfolios (SL, SM, SH) and the average of the returns on the three big 
size portfolios (BL, BM, BH).  HML is calculated as the difference between the average 
of the returns on the two high BM portfolios (BH, SH) and the average of the returns on 
the two low BM portfolios (BL, SL). 
The sample for both the accruals quality factor (AQF) and disclosure quality factor 
(DQF) is the common sample of 5,723 usable firm-year observations. To construct the 
AQF, we partition the firms into five groups on the basis of the AQ score. The AQF is 
defined as the difference between the average of the value-weighted two lowest accruals 
quality score (highest numerical value of |DAC|) portfolio returns and the average of the 
value-weighted returns on the two highest accruals quality score (lowest numerical value 
of |DAC|) portfolios. Similarly, the DQF is constructed from the difference in average 
value-weighted returns between the two lowest disclosure quality score portfolios and the 
two highest disclosure quality score portfolios. 
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6. Empirical results 
6.1 The association between accruals quality and disclosure quality 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the factors. First, the Fama-French 
factors, SMB and HML, and the AQF and DQF factors, all have positive average values, 
while the excess market return has a negative average value. None of these average 
values is significantly different from zero. The positive AQF, although insignificant, 
suggests that firms with the lowest accruals quality score generate higher returns than 
firms with the highest accruals quality score. This is consistent with low information 
quality firms generating a high equity premium. Second, the monthly average returns of 
AQF and DQF, 0.003763 and 0.003727 respectively, are similar. A highly significant 
sample correlation coefficient between AQF and DQF of 0.79 indicates a positive 
association between disclosure quality and accruals quality.  
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
To answer our first research question, regarding the relationship between accruals 
quality and disclosure quality, we sort the firms that were alive at the end of June of each 
year into six portfolios on the basis of their disclosure quality scores. Table 3 reports 
descriptive statistics. Firms with low disclosure quality scores also tend to have low 
accruals quality (high |DAC|), and vice versa. The relation is monotonic: moving from 
the low to the high disclosure quality portfolios, accruals quality increases. This result is 
consistent with a recent study by Francis et al., (2008), which reports a positive 
association between earnings quality and voluntary disclosure.  
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There is a positive association also between firm size, proxied by the natural 
logarithm of market value, and the quality of disclosure. Monthly returns for firms with 
high DQ and AQ are lower than those for firms with low DQ and AQ. This supports the 
risk-based theory in which investors demand higher returns for investing in risky (low 
AQ and DQ) firms. 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
6.2 Accruals quality and disclosure quality: substitutes or complements? 
Prior studies report that an AQF and a DQF are significant in explaining the time-
series variation in portfolio returns (Core, Guay and Verdi, 2008; Hussainey and 
Mouselli, 2010).The question we are trying to answer here is: are these factors substitutes 
for each other, or are they complementary? In other words, do these factors proxy for the 
same risk and contain the same information? If this is true, we expect them to explain the 
same set of portfolios (i.e., the 16 size-BM portfolios and the 20 industry portfolios). 
 
To address this question, we run the following time-series regressions on the excess 
returns of the 16 size-BM portfolios:  
ittiAQtiSMBtiHMLftMtiMiftit AQFSMBHMLRRaRR   )(               (6) 
ittiDQtiSMBtiHMLftMtiMiftit DQFSMBHMLRRaRR   )(            (7) 
where: 
 tt DQFAQF ,  are the returns for month t for the AQ and DQ factors, respectively.  
We use standard t-tests to evaluate the significance of the coefficients on the AQ and DQ 
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factors individually, and the Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) GRS F-test to examine 
the joint-significance of the intercepts and the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) 
for the joint significance of the coefficients. If the coefficients of a tested risk factor are 
jointly significant, then this variable is a useful factor in explaining portfolio returns and 
vice versa.  
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) warn against using portfolios formed on the basis of 
any characteristic that is known to be associated with returns in testing asset pricing 
models. Berk (2000) shows that sorting stocks into portfolios, based on a variable known 
a priori to be correlated with returns, increases the variation in realised excess returns 
across portfolios, and biases the test towards rejection of an economically correct asset 
pricing model. Accordingly we also use industry portfolios in our asset pricing tests. 
We use the London Share Price Database Industrial Classification (G17) and the 
FTSE Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) to construct 20 industry portfolios. We 
calculate the value-weighted returns of these portfolios on the assumption that they are 
bought and held for a year.  Repeating this process, year by year, produces a time-series 
of portfolio monthly returns from July 1997 to June 2004. The excess returns on these 20 
portfolios are also used as dependent variables in the time-series regressions.
7
 
In order to examine the incremental explanatory power of AQF and DQF, we 
construct the first principal component analysis factor (PCAF) from AQF and DQF and 
run the following time-series regressions on both sets of portfolios: 
 
ittiAQtiSMBtiHMLftMtiMiftit PCAFSMBHMLRRaRR   )(               (8) 
                                                 
7
 Descriptive statistics for both sets of portfolios are reported by Hussainey and Mouselli (2010). 
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Given that the first principal component factor constructed from a set of variables should 
capture most of the variation in these variables, we expect the new factor (PCAF) to 
capture the information of these variables and combine their explanatory power. This will 
enable us to summarise the information of both variables in a single variable, and test 
whether (8) can explain the average excess returns on the portfolios better than either (6) 
or (7). 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the p-values from the F-tests for the joint 
significance of the loadings are less than 1%. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Michou, Mouselli and Stark (2007),that SMB, HML and excess market returns are 
significant in explaining the time-series variation of size-BM portfolio returns in the UK. 
Panel B of Table 4 reveals that the AQF explains the time-series variation of six 
individual portfolios, while the DQF explains the time-series variation of seven 
individual portfolios. These results suggest that the disclosure quality and accruals quality 
factors contain similar information, and explain the variation in the same set of portfolios. 
The F-statistics from the SUR estimation indicate that the AQF and DQF are also 
significant risk factors in explaining the time-series variation in portfolio returns, with p-
values of less than 1%. Moreover, PCAF explains the time-series variation in seven 
individual portfolios. The F-statistic for the significance of PCAF is larger than the F-
statistics for the significance of AQF and DQF. This result suggests that AQF and DQF 
contain similar information, and can be viewed as substitutes for each other. 
 
Insert Table 4 Here 
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Panel A of Table 5 is consistent with our previous results for the 16 size-BM 
portfolios regarding the significance of Fama-French factors. The SMB, HML and excess 
market returns factors are significant in explaining the time-series variation of industry 
returns in the UK. The F-statistics from the SUR estimation in Panel B of Table 5 
indicate that the AQF and DQF are significant risk factors in explaining the time-series 
variation in portfolio returns, with p-values less than 1%. The AQF, with nine significant 
coefficients, has greater explanatory power for the time-series variation in individual 
portfolio returns than the DQF, with seven significant coefficients. Moreover, the PCAF 
explains the time-series variation of 10 individual portfolio returns. As before, it appears 
that AQF and DQF contain similar information, and can be interpreted as substitutes for 
one another. 
 
Insert Table 5 Here 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study examines the relationship between two proxies of information risk, accru 
als quality and disclosure quality, in a portfolio grouping framework. It employs the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy for a firm’s accruals quality, and the 
number of future-oriented statements in corporate annual report narrative sections 
containing earnings-related topics as a proxy for corporate disclosure quality. We 
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examine whether disclosure quality and accruals quality are complements or substitutes 
as risk factors in explaining the time-series variation in portfolio returns. 
 
The results from the portfolio groupings suggest a positive association between 
accruals quality and voluntary disclosure, consistent with Lobo and Zhou (2001) and 
Francis et al., (2008). These findings carry implications for the regulatory bodies’ efforts 
in encouraging firms to enhance information disclosure, in order to increase the 
incentives for managers to meet earnings expectations. Our findings are consistent with 
the Verrecchia’s (1990) theoretical model, in which an increase in the quality of 
information available to managers leads to more disclosure on their part. When managers 
engage less in earnings management, the information quality of earnings is higher, and 
more information is disclosed. On the contrary, asset pricing tests show that an accruals 
quality factor (AQF) has more explanatory power than a disclosure quality factor (DQF) 
for the time-series variation in the excess returns on 20 industry portfolios. DQF has 
more explanatory power than AQF, however, for the time-series variation in the excess 
returns on 16 size-BM portfolios. These findings imply that, although accruals quality 
and disclosure quality are complementary sources of information for investors, AQF and 
DQF, interpreted as risk factors, are substitutes rather than complements. A principal 
components analysis factor (PCAF), which combines AQF and DQF, has slightly more 
explanatory power than either AQF or DQF individually. 
Several further observations can be made. First, market participants may tend to view 
firms with higher levels of disclosure as likely to demonstrate superior earnings quality. 
Second, an asset pricing implication of the results is that accruals quality and disclosure 
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quality factors can be used interchangeably in asset pricing tests, because these two risk 
factors contain similar information content. 
One limitation of this study is that it uses the number of future-oriented disclosures as 
a proxy for disclosure quality. However, other disclosure quality attributes (such as 
verifiability, comprehensiveness, readability, neutrality, comparability and relevance) 
should also be considered to provide a reasonable proxy for disclosure quality. Further 
research could refine our disclosure quality measures by considering these other 
attributes and examining the extent to which disclosure quality and accruals quality are 
substitutes or complements in explaining the time-series variation in portfolio returns. In 
addition, future research could shed light on the extent to which our findings are 
applicable to other European countries. It would be interesting to examine the period of 
the recent financial crisis to investigate whether accruals quality and disclosure quality 
are influenced by economic circumstances.  Finally, this paper employs Fama-French 
model as the benchmark asset pricing model in the UK stock market. Hence, testing the 
robustness of our result using alternative models such as the Carhart (1997) model is 
another possible avenue for future research.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Disclosure Keywords 
 
Note: Panel A contains the list of key words that are used to identify future-oriented statements in the 
annual report narrative sections. The future year numbers must be preceded by one of the following 
prepositions: ‘during’, ‘for’, ‘in’, ‘into’, ‘of’, ‘through’ or ‘throughout’. Panel B contains 12 earnings 
related keywords. The list is identified from a sample of sell-side analysts’ reports. Where applicable, the 
plural of a keyword is also included in the text search. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Accelerate
  Anticipate
  Await 
  Coming (financial) years
  Coming months
  Confidence, Confident) 
  Convince 
  Current (financial) year
  Envisage
  Benefit Profitability 
  Break even Return 
  Budget Trading 
Forecast 
Next
Novel 
Optimistic
Outlook
Panel A: Future-oriented keywords 
Estimate
Eventual 
Expect
Scope for, Scope to
Shall
Shortly 
Planned, Planning 
Predict
Prospect 
Remain 
Forthcoming 
Hope 
Intend, Intention 
Likely, Unlikely 
Should 
Soon 
Well placed, Well positioned 
Year(s) ahead
Future year numbers (1997; 
1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; …..)
Will 
Renew
Panel B: Earnings-related keywords 
Contribution 
Earnings 
EPS
Loss 
Margin 
Profit  
Look forward, Look ahead
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for, and Correlations between, the Five Risk  
              Factors ( Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, AQF and DQF) 
 
Notes: Rm-Rf is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the size factor defined as the 
monthly difference between average return on small size portfolios and the average return on big 
size portfolios. , HML is the value factor defined as the monthly difference between average return 
on the high B/M portfolios and the average return on the low B/M portfolios, AQF is the return on 
the accruals quality factor and DQF is the return on the disclosure quality factor.  
**,*** denote significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Non-DQ and DQ Portfolios 
 
Notes: Monthly returns are value-weighted returns. BM is the ratio of book equity to market equity. 
ME is the market equity. |DAC| is absolute discretionary accruals measured using the modified-
Jones model. A higher numerical value of |DAC| indicates lower accruals quality, and vice versa. All 
ratios are computed at the end of June of year t. Portfolios are formed annually, based on DQ. 
Portfolio 0 comprises all firms with zero DQ for year t. Portfolio Low comprises the lowest quintile 
of firms sorted on the basis of DQ. Portfolio High comprises the highest quintile of firms based on 
DQ. 
 
 
 
 
R m -R f SMB HML AQF DQF
Mean -0.00055 0.00283 0.007148 0.003763 0.003727
Median 0.002136 0.006029 0.004805 0.001653 0.002125
Std. Dev. 0.045341 0.039416 0.037698 0.032969 0.028263
R m -R f SMB HML AQF DQF
R m -R f 1 -0.11 -0.25** 0.14 -0.08
SMB 1 -0.29*** 0.44*** 0.37***
HML 1 -0.61*** -0.56***
AQF 1 0.78***
DQF 1
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Monthly Returns
Panel B: Correlations
Portfolio
Monthly 
Return 
(%)
ln(ME) BM DQ |DAC| Firms
0 -1.21 5.6 0.77 0 0.16 75
Low 0.93 5.22 0.77 1.16 0.13 124
2 0.71 5.84 0.81 2.57 0.12 186
3 0.64 6.11 0.73 4.07 0.1 131
4 0.05 6.78 0.74 5.87 0.09 145
High 0.38 7.74 0.73 10.55 0.07 156
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Table 4 Loadings from Time-Series Regressions for 16 Size-BM Portfolios  
 
Panel A: Loadings on the Fama-French Factors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 2 3 High Low 2 3 High
F
Small 0.80 0.59 0.46 0.77 1.00 1.03 1.13 3.16 1.29
2 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.31 0.00 0.03 0.83 0.19
3 -0.48 -0.08 0.00 0.33 -1.41 -0.33 -0.01 1.32
Big -0.08 0.20 -0.15 0.30 -0.31 0.76 -0.49 0.57
F
Small 0.88 0.72 0.69 0.46 5.83 5.26 9.53 6.87 48.19
2 1.16 0.92 0.79 0.79 10.43 10.24 15.40 10.92 <0.01
3 1.24 1.07 0.80 0.85 14.81 15.25 10.47 10.19
Big 0.84 0.94 0.89 1.30 12.87 15.33 8.63 8.04
F
Small 1.34 1.15 0.96 0.70 5.40 4.98 9.02 6.94 >100
2 1.31 1.02 0.84 0.82 12.62 9.89 12.05 8.55 <0.01
3 1.12 1.00 0.89 0.88 14.26 15.21 14.85 13.37
Big -0.09 -0.06 0.02 0.33 -1.29 -0.76 0.25 2.41
F
Small -0.57 -0.10 0.07 0.15 -2.37 -0.74 0.57 1.41 22.69
2 -0.27 -0.02 0.35 0.49 -1.70 -0.26 4.07 4.71 <0.01
3 -0.23 0.36 0.53 0.69 -2.31 5.66 5.38 6.98
Big -0.55 0.28 0.55 0.73 -6.80 2.84 4.47 4.89
Low 2 3 High
Small 54.41 55.00 62.15 59.24
2 78.40 77.96 76.57 64.97
3 82.61 87.42 81.35 80.65
Big 80.71 73.81 70.05 54.89
 t
βM tβ
βSMB tβ
βHML tβ
Adj-R
2
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Panel B: Loadings on AQF, DQF, and PCAF of the Four Factor Models  
 
Notes: This table reports the loadings from time-series regressions for 16 size-BM portfolios. The 
t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, using the Newey-West 
estimator with five lags. The sample period is July 1997 to June 2004. The last column reports F-
statistics, and their p-values, from a GRS F-test for the intercept terms and from Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR), testing the joint significance of the remaining loadings. The 
intercepts are in percentages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 2 3 High Low 2 3 High
F
Small 1.36 0.57 0.28 0.05 3.85 1.64 1.36 0.38 6.38
2 0.75 0.43 0.02 -0.09 3.82 4.54 0.19 -0.84 <0.01
3 0.50 -0.09 -0.24 -0.35 4.04 -1.32 -2.70 -4.46
Big -0.04 -0.11 -0.21 0.06 -0.33 -1.27 -1.37 0.38
F
Small 1.44 0.76 0.33 0.12 2.83 1.92 1.64 0.81 6.44
2 0.74 0.36 -0.03 -0.17 5.09 3.30 -0.35 -0.98 <0.01
3 0.44 -0.20 -0.32 -0.33 2.99 -2.41 -2.95 -3.44
Big 0.00 -0.12 -0.29 -0.21 0.03 -0.98 -1.89 -0.94
F
Small 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 4.19 1.94 1.60 0.65 9.13
2 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 4.79 4.88 -0.08 -1.23 <0.01
3 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 4.10 -2.23 -2.90 -4.27
Big 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.17 -1.15 -1.71 -0.42
             βPCAF tβ
βAQF tβ
βDQF tβ
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Table 5 Loadings from Time-Series Regressions on 20 Industry Portfolios 
 
Panel A: Loadings on the Fama-French Factors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry  t βM tβ(M) βSMB tβ(SMB) βHML tβ(HML) Adj-R
2
1 -0.07 -0.07 0.79 3.04 0.52 2.21 0.50 1.63 16.12
2 -0.22 -0.53 0.95 7.83 0.38 2.38 0.35 2.69 46.93
3 0.40 0.55 1.43 7.38 0.30 1.69 0.61 2.58 49.04
4 -0.08 -0.18 1.13 9.98 0.48 3.46 0.65 5.88 58.31
5 0.59 0.89 1.39 10.11 0.09 0.38 0.64 3.17 46.37
6 0.87 1.74 0.61 6.49 0.47 4.47 0.17 1.80 28.91
7 0.02 0.02 1.88 6.62 1.33 4.27 0.07 0.28 54.45
8 -0.63 -1.29 1.17 7.80 0.62 5.12 0.54 3.27 57.17
9 -0.10 -0.25 1.03 7.47 0.38 3.33 0.34 2.13 58.67
10 -0.22 -0.63 1.07 12.90 0.58 7.44 0.00 -0.02 68.63
11 0.18 0.28 1.21 8.18 0.33 1.68 0.26 1.40 37.01
12 0.08 0.19 0.58 3.74 -0.04 -0.31 0.44 1.88 27.16
13 0.79 1.31 0.85 4.47 -0.05 -0.18 0.45 2.11 28.17
14 -0.17 -0.31 0.57 4.74 -0.24 -1.53 0.14 0.95 21.36
15 0.08 0.17 0.57 5.00 -0.05 -0.39 0.46 2.36 30.27
16 0.17 0.34 0.84 5.26 0.24 1.53 0.31 1.19 33.09
17 0.12 0.17 1.26 9.91 0.59 3.54 -0.48 -2.00 53.51
18 -0.39 -0.84 1.19 8.57 0.41 3.15 0.59 3.79 63.14
19 0.12 0.10 1.98 8.17 1.17 4.90 -1.02 -2.73 61.23
20 0.70 1.35 0.89 5.13 -0.35 -2.13 -0.44 -1.70 47.18
F 0.7 59.63 6.37 6.49
P-value 0.83 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
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Panel B: Loadings on AQF, DQF, and PCAF of the Four Factor    
              Models  
 
Notes: This table reports the loadings from time-series regressions for 20 industry 
portfolios. The t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, 
using the Newey-West (1987) estimator with five lags. The sample period is July 
1997 to June 2004. The last two rows report F-statistics, and their p-values. For the 
intercepts, F-stat is computed from GRS F-stats, testing the joint significance of the 
intercepts. However, F-stats for the remaining coefficients are from a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR), testing the joint significance of the loadings. The 
intercepts are in percentages. 
 
Industry βAQF tβ(AQF) βDQF tβ(DQF) βPCAF tβ(PCAF)
1 -0.44 -1.29 -0.52 -1.30 -0.02 -1.40
2 -0.26 -1.02 -0.40 -1.10 -0.01 -1.06
3 0.13 0.41 -0.17 -0.47 0.00 -0.04
4 -0.41 -2.26 -0.61 -2.33 -0.02 -2.20
5 -0.28 -0.82 -0.56 -1.81 -0.01 -1.36
6 0.04 0.23 -0.06 -0.29 0.00 -0.05
7 -0.76 -2.81 -0.53 -1.73 -0.02 -2.41
8 -0.73 -3.26 -0.81 -3.44 -0.03 -3.27
9 -0.46 -2.99 -0.36 -1.92 -0.01 -2.62
10 -0.17 -1.05 -0.28 -1.74 -0.01 -1.46
11 -1.24 -5.13 -1.26 -5.62 -0.04 -5.63
12 -0.55 -2.78 -0.90 -3.96 -0.02 -3.54
13 -0.51 -1.93 -0.77 -2.86 -0.02 -2.99
14 -0.06 -0.28 -0.08 -0.37 0.00 -0.38
15 -0.29 -1.55 -0.23 -0.97 -0.01 -1.41
16 -0.31 -1.44 -0.42 -1.74 -0.01 -1.71
17 0.78 3.17 0.48 1.89 0.02 3.14
18 -0.44 -3.22 -0.60 -4.51 -0.02 -3.76
19 1.12 1.95 0.82 1.72 0.03 1.88
20 0.71 3.25 1.03 3.69 0.03 3.68
F 5.44 4.04 5.85
P-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
